Publisher's Synopsis
The purpose of this monograph is to provide context for the examination of doctrine as it evolves during and following a period of conflict. To accomplish this, the lenses of anticipation, adaptation, and emergence are applied to the U.S. Army Field Artillery's role through a chronological historical case study of U.S. Army Field Artillery doctrine from 1919-1954. This is done by using the Interwar Period that lead to the 1939 doctrine, the European and Pacific Theater experiences in World War II, and the time period leading up to and through the Korean War. This analysis focuses on the FM 6-20 Artillery Tactics and Technique and the FM 100-5 Field Service Regulations, and the iterations published between 1939 and 1954. By utilizing the overarching doctrine and examining the understanding of that doctrine as it applied at the time, along with political aspects that affected the strategic aims, an understanding of how the new doctrine developed emerges. It is possible, then, to extract the implications of the assumptions originally made and how they influenced the requirements for Field Artillery in performing their doctrinal role. This monograph concludes that following the Korean War, the recognition of a need for more artillery in heavier calibers emerged. This resulted in the advent of artillery's role as both an atomic capability and a contributor to combined arms maneuver, providing a more comprehensive anticipation for future combat through long-range conventional and atomic fires than was previously described in doctrine.The United States Army Field Artillery was one of the sub-cultures affected by the development of the national superpower status. Going into the war, the artillery community had an understanding of their role based on lessons learned from World War I and the incorporation of the doctrinal approach of methodical battle. This approach "prized fire power over all else," enabling a rapid transition from the defense to the offense where the enemy would "succumb to a methodical advance." Actions in World War II altered this perception, and the Field Artillery community identified the need to incorporate the lessons from the war and adapt. They understood that these decisions required implementation into doctrine, and the advent of the aerial delivered atomic weapons and other maneuver war fighting philosophies influenced these decisions.This was not the first time that the Field Artillery community faced the problem of enacting new doctrine. Following World War I, the Field Artillery community based the anticipation of their role in the next conflict on the successful results in the Great War. While there were changes to their role in World War II, following the war the artillery community fell back on beliefs that they could adapt their role in a similar manner as they had during the Interwar Period, from 1919 to 1941, again focusing on their success in the war with the emergence of combined arms maneuver. The expansion of influence on a global scale was not the primary foundation shaping their new role or doctrinal decisions; rather success in battle provided a majority of the emphasis in the doctrinal response.IntroductionSection 1: Artillery as King: Decisive in Methodical Battle to Decisive, Combined Arms Maneuver 1919-1945Section 2: The King Dethroned: The Artillery Returns to the Barracks 1945-1950Section 3: The Return of the King: Decisive in Korea to the Atomic Effect 1950-1954Conclusion
