Publisher's Synopsis
In Crimea, Donbass, Aleppo, and over the English Channel, Russia is using its still-modernizing military to (re)gain territory, secure geopolitical access and influence, convey geopolitical strength domestically and internationally, and test the political resolve of others. While the Russians pose a real military threat to the United States and many European countries, the U.S. Army should ensure it prepares against Russian -and not Soviet - forces. This paper builds on tactical and operational analyses of how Russians approach war against a competing power to outline strategic implications for the U.S. Army. The paper concludes that understanding how Russians approach war, while keeping Russian successes and problems in context, will allow U.S. leaders to pursue military and political policies that maintain respect for this resurgent Russian power without overestimating Russia's military capabilities.This compilation also includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.1. Russia Can and Will Prosecute a Different Type of Warfare than the United States * 2. Russia's Military Believes Nuclear War Could Be a Reality * 3. Russia's Post-2008 Military Modernization is Real, but it was Undertaken and Appears More Dramatic for a Host of Reasons * 4. Alternative Arguments * 5. Recommendations for the U.S. Army With Respect to Competing Powers * 6. ConclusionTo be able to deter, and defeat if needed, the Russian military, the U.S. Army must understand how Russians approach warfare - including how they man, train, equip, and organize their military - in addition to the Armed Forces' ongoing combat operations. Recent publications provide excellent tactical and operational analyses of the Russian military, including the Foreign Military Studies Office's (FMSO) 2017 report on The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces (hereafter, RWW). In particular, RWW identifies important details on the Armed Forces' composition, structure, way of fighting, and modernization plans, stemming in part from Russia's real and perceived threats. The RWW also describes major reforms Russia began two months after it invaded Georgia in 2008.
