Publisher's Synopsis
To be an effective operational approach, by, with, and through (BWT) must address the entire spectrum of conflict to successfully employ and maximize the capacity and unique capabilities of surrogate forces. Partner operations are not the only means to shape the theater or address contingency operations. With the return of great power competition, current adversaries possess the ability to contest the U.S. military in multiple domains through layers of strategic and operational stand-off. The use of surrogate forces provides unique capabilities and the means to provide access and depth while also preserving strategic flexibility, building legitimacy, and extending operational reach. However, to succeed, partner operations and the use of surrogate forces require the careful alignment of interests; unity of command balanced with the need to preserve partner agency; the careful employment of surrogate forces within their capabilities; the necessary resources and enabler support to sustain operations; and unity of effort toward a common objective. Most importantly, however, partnerships are maintained and continued through personal relationships, leadership, and mutual trust. To validate this thesis, this paper is divided into four sections. The first section establishes the framework for analysis by providing a description of BWT, an overview of current doctrine and appropriate terminology, and a discussion of partner operations as a component unified action, unified land operations, and multi-domain operations. Using the North Burma Campaign of 1943-1944, the paper will examine the use of the Chinese Army in India and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Detachment (DET) 101 to assess the relative effectiveness of surrogate forces and the components of partner operations that enabled the achievement of operational and strategic objectives. The final section addresses the benefits of partnered operations and how surrogate forces provide multidimensional solutions to enable armed conflict.This compilation also includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.1. Introduction * By, With, and Through Overview * Definitions * Current Doctrine Governing Partner Operations * Defining the Operational Problem * 2. CBI Theater Overview * Evolution of Allied Strategy in the CBI * The Campaign Plan * North Burma Area of Operations * 3. Case Study 1: X Force (CAI) * Introduction * Background to the X Force * Task Organization * U.S. Training and Advisor Mission and U.S. Partnered Forces * CAI Operations in Support of the North Burma Campaign * Phase 1: Initial Operations through the Tanai River (October 1943-January 1944) * Phase 2: Attack through Jambu Bum (February 1944-April 1944) * Phase 3: Advance and Seizure of Myitkyina (April 1944-August 1944) * Analyzing the Effectiveness of CAI Operational Approach * 4. Case Study 2: Detachment 101 (OSS) * Introduction * Establishing DET 101 (April 1942-December 1943) * Supporting the Campaign (February 1944-August 1944) * Analyzing the Effectiveness of DET 101 in Partner Operations * 5. Analysis of Partner Operations and BWT * Aligned Interests between Partners * Existing Partnered Force Structures and Capability * Unity of Command and Partnered Force Agency * Planned Operations that Leverage Partnered Force Strengths * Unity of Effort and Partnered Force Integration * Sufficient Resources to Ensure Success * 6. Conclusion
