Publisher's Synopsis
This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. In September 1980, Saddam Hussein invaded Iran, which initiated one of the longest and bloodiest wars in contemporary Middle Eastern history. Saddam most likely chose to use military force because of threats to his regime from Iranian-sponsored subversion which he failed to counter with diplomacy, combined with the opportunity presented by Iran's increased vulnerability after the fall of the Shah. However, Saddam's military objective was too limited to force a negotiated settlement and he inflamed Iranian nationalism, thus sparking the eight year war that greatly exceeded Iraq's means. Key lessons of this war include the importance of selecting military centers of gravity, the critical impact of assumptions that prove false, and nationalism's unpredictability and impact on war. This paper will focus on Saddam's decision to go to war and his initial strategy. The Iran-Iraq war is worth studying to understand the relationship between ends, ways and means and why Saddam exceeded his means. We will examine, from a strategic and military perspective, Saddam Hussein's decision to go to war, what he hoped to gain, why his strategy failed to balance ends and means and the lessons learned that could facilitate successful strategy in the future. In context of the era, Saddam's rule was vulnerable to domestic turmoil supported by the revolutionary regime in Iran. In 1979, after the Islamic Revolution swept Iran, resulting in the overthrow of the Shah, Iran began publicly urging the Iraqi population to rise up and overthrow the Iraqi government because of fundamental differences in the respective regimes. First, Iraq was led by the Sunni Islamic sect, which had a history of tension and conflict with the Shia, the principal Iranian Islamic sect. Secondly, after the revolution the new regime declared Iran to be the "Islamic Republic" and in its constitution described the government as "a system based on the belief in religious leadership and continuous guidance." The Iraqi Bathist regime was a secular government, and Saddam urged Arab nationalism over religious fundamentalism-he wanted to foster a homogenous society of Shia, Sunni and Kurds. Third, Iran viewed Iraq as pro-western and Iran was anti-western because of the west's support for the Shah and also because Iran perceived the west as a threat to Islam.
