Publisher's Synopsis
What kind of policy can the United States and the international community pursue that increases the likelihood that stability emerges in failed and failing states? I develop a theory of state-building to guide decision makers. The theory states that if decision makers want to foster stability in other countries via state-building, they should prioritize (1) the cultivation of indigenous systems (economic, security, judicial, and social) over externally-imposed systems and (2) stability over democratization. Pulling inductively from four cases studies (Somalia, East Timor, Haiti, and Bosnia and Herzegovina), I craft a theory--using Craig Parsons's typology of causal logics--that explains how the prioritization of externally-imposed systems and democratization lead to deleterious, and unintended consequences via institutional path dependence. I argue that policymakers should prioritize the cultivation of indigenous structures and stability by attending to indigenous officials, populations, and systems from the local to the national levels. This theory has implications for policymakers considering state-building efforts as a way to increase their respective states' security.
