Publisher's Synopsis
In this study, Robert Stein asks whether the way cities are organized affects how well they provide services for their residents. He weighs the small and large organizational choices every local government makes - from its paper flow and chain-of-command to its funding sources and contracting arrangements - against the real end results of services for citizens: sanitation, transportation, public safety and education. Though the organizational structure of local governments has often been studied, researchers until now have relatively ignored the relationship between a city's organization and its actual performance.;Stein frames the issue of service arrangements around the market maximization models of Paul Peterson, James Buchanan and Gary Miller. He argues that Peterson's condition of limited municipal service responsibility is actually more variable than originally reported. Stein's findings are based upon a survey revealing differences between old industrial cities and young postindustrial cities, metropolitan and non- metropolitan areas, as well as the definitions of similar units of government among these.;Institutional rules and procedures used in the decision-making process are also examined, including the often controversial decision to contract out for a service. In the author's view a diversity of arrangements - among private and public providers - increases the efficiency of a city's municipal spending.;Finally, Stein discusses future trends for municipal service provision, paying particular attention to the role city service arrangement plays in defining the scope of municipal responsibility.
