Publisher's Synopsis
This is the sixth volume in a planned nine-volume operational and chronological seriescovering the Marine Corps ' participation in the Vietnam War . A separate functionalseries will complement the operational histories . This volume details the change in UnitedStates policy for the Vietnam War. After a thorough review, President Richard M . Nixonadopted a policy of seeking to end United States military involvement in Vietnam eithe rthrough negotiations or, failing that, turning the combat role over to the South Vietnamese. It was this decision that began the Vietnamization of the war in the summe rof 1969 and which would soon greatly reduce and then end the Marine Corps' comba trole in the war.The Marines of III Marine Amphibious Force continued the full range of military an dpacification activities within I Corps Tactical Zone during this period of transition . Unti lwithdrawn, the 3d Marine Division, employing highly mobile tactics, successfully bluntedNorth Vietnamese Army efforts to reintroduce troops and supplies into Quang Tr iProvince . The 1st Marine Division, concentrated in Quang Nam Province, continued bot hmobile offensive and pacification operations to protect the city of Da Nang and surroundingpopulation centers . The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing provided air support to both divisions, as well as other allied units in I Corps, while Force Logistic Command served al lmajor Marine commands .Although written from the perspective of III MAF and the Marine ground war in ICorps, an attempt has been made to place the Marine role in relation to the overall Ameri -can effort . The volume also treats the Marine Corps' participation in the advisory effort, the operations of the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force, and, to a lesser extent, th eactivities of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), 23d Infantry (Americal) Division, and 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) . There are separate chapters on Marineair, artillery, surveillance, and logistics .The nature of the war facing III MAF during 1969 forced the author to concentrat eon major operations . This focus in no way slights those Marines whose combat servic einvolved innumerable patrols, wearying hours of perimeter defense, and long days o fproviding logistical and administrative support for those in the field . III MAF's combatsuccesses in 1969 came from the combined efforts of all Americans in I Corps .The author, Charles R . Smith, has been with the History and Museums Division sinc eJuly 1971. He has published several articles on military history, and is the author of Marinerin the Revolution: A History of the Continental Marines in the American Revolution,1775-1783 (Washington: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1975) . He is a graduate of theUniversity of California, Santa Barbara, and received his master 's degree in history fromSan Diego State University. He served in Vietnam with the 101st Airborne Division (Air -mobile) in 1968 and 1969, first as an artilleryman and then as a historian .*4Vft!nE. H. SIMMONSBrigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret . )Director of Marine Corps History and Museums
