Publisher's Synopsis
Dr. Robert S. Cameron's To Fight or Not to Fight? Organizational and Doctrinal Trends in Mounted Maneuver Reconnaissance from the Interwar Years to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM provides a narrative analysis of US Army reconnaissance, scout, and cavalry evolution from the post-World War I era through the Iraqi conflict. It outlines key developments in the concepts governing reconnaissance units from the armored cavalry regiment down to the maneuver battalion scout platoon. These changes are placed in the context of national defense policy decisions and major Army initiatives. The title derives from the almost cyclic shifts between reconnaissance organizations oriented on information collection and those designed for a broader mission set. The text focuses on doctrinal and organizational changes, but training, materiel development, and the impact of combat operations constitute important supporting themes. This study also traces the transition from horse to vehicular reconnaissance, later bolstered by air cavalry and more recently with a variety of sensors and unmanned systems. The chronicle of this transition highlights another persistent theme: the impact of technology on reconnaissance. It addresses an issue with which scouts in today's high-tech world continue to grapple: finding the correct balance between man and machine for effective reconnaissance. The trend analysis included in these pages shows how mounted reconnaissance arrived at its current state. The author provides a clear depiction of past evolution to guide future reconnaissance development. Given the ongoing changes today within the Army generally and the reconnaissance community in particular, such an analysis has immediate relevance. The insights and information provided help to determine those capabilities scouts need on future battlefields and how best to acquire them. In this sense, this book is part of a larger effort by the Armor Branch to shape future mounted maneuver reconnaissance in a sensible and effective manner. However, it is clear from this text that developing the right doctrine, organization, and platform to ensure our reconnaissance Soldiers are configured for success in ever-changing operational environments is a complex process. To Fight or Not to Fight? is a must read for those responsible for designing reconnaissance organizations, writing the related doctrine, establishing the materiel requirements, and training scouts. It is also recommended for those serving in reconnaissance organizations who every day discover new trails for others to follow. Much has been written about cavalry and reconnaissance, but this literature generally focuses on a specific era, platform, combat operation, or personal account of service. Missing from this body of literature is an overarching analysis of American cavalry and reconnaissance development. This book fills that void, providing a single source reference for a critical dimension of mounted maneuver history. These pages should resonate with anyone who has served in or supported a cavalry, reconnaissance, or scout unit. They remind us of the importance of what the horse cavalry once called "mental mobility."
