Publisher's Synopsis
This thesis is about the relationship between time and being, and in particular, Martin Heidegger's account of that relationship in Being and Time. It elaborates two central claims, in both exegetical and substantive terms, each of which challenges a dominant view of Heidegger's work. First, most readers of Being and Time have focused upon what it says about being, and taken its claims about time as secondary. I challenge this view, arguing that for Heidegger, time is interrelated to being such that one cannot clarify the sense of the latter without first clarifying the sense of the former. I advance a novel conception of time, which I take to be the one Heidegger was working towards. Second, a prevail- ing interpretation of Being and Time holds that the issue at stake in Heidegger's project is intelligibility. To be, the view goes, is to be intelligible or meaningful. Against this, I argue that the non-intelligible plays a privileged role in Heidegger's account of what one is asking after, in asking after being.
