Publisher's Synopsis
The purpose of this paper is to determine and analyze the considerations for the redeployment of a US Army corps. The redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division from Vietnam in Operation Keystone Blue Jay, Military Traffic Management Command's after action reviews (AAR) from various Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises, and AAR's from the redeployment from Operation Desert Storm form the basis of the study. This paper begins with a discussion of the need to consider redeployment as the US Army downsizes in a changing world environment. The author's belief is that a smaller Army must be efficient in its redeployment in order to meet its various contingency missions. Headlines from the redeployment from Operation Desert Storm indicate a four to nine month lag time between return to the United States and readiness to deploy. The lessons from Operation Keystone Blue Jay, REFORGER exercises and Operation Desert Storm are examined to identify common ground. The common thread between all three events indicates a failure to consider redeployment during the deliberate planning process, combined with leadership failures while maintaining, moving, and loading equipment for redeployment. The study concludes by examining the redeployment needs of a corps in four areas: doctrine, training, organization, and leadership. Doctrine for redeployment is virtually nonexistent. The author offers a proposal for doctrinal redeployment considerations that, if adopted, would alleviate a number of the systemic problems uncovered in the study.
