Publisher's Synopsis
This is an inquiry into the moral and legal basis of the "right to silence" in Anglo-American law, from a philosophical standpoint. It examines the problems, suggesting proposals for change and advances the arguments for and against the existing right to silence.;Chapter 1 will consider the existing law on the right to silence. This will be followed in chapter 2 by an examination of the major reviews of the law and recommendations for reform. Chapters 3,4 and 5 will critically assess the principal arguments for change, namely that the right to silence is anachronistic and that it primarily protects the guilty. Reference will be made to the specific problems of Northern Ireland. Rights-based and consequentialist arguments are examined in chapter 6, where the jurisprudential approaches of Bentham and Dworkin and their implications for this issue are considered. The implementation of changes to the right to silence is considered in chapter 7 and the experience of other jurisdictions is reviewed.;The remainder of the text considers the extent to which the right to silence exists in practice. The rationality of the exclusion of bodily samples from the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination is reviewed in chapter 8 where it is argued that the distinction between speech and bodily samples rests on a crude version of Cartesian dualism. The statutory and common law limitations are examined in chapter 9 where attention is also given to the reasons why the right to silence is usually waived in practice. In view of the weakness of the utilitarian arguments for abolition and the importance of the right to silence in protecting the individual, it is concluded that the right to silence should be retained and strengthened, rather than abolished or diluted.
