Publisher's Synopsis
This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1878 edition. Excerpt: ... 5. Some solve them by duplicity, the deception arising from the double sense in which the word is used. Chap, xxv 1. Arguments deduced from what is properly and not simply predicated, we must solve by comparing the opponent's conclusion with our own thesis, in order to ascertain whether a statement can be made, not simply but in a certain respect or relation. 2. A thing may be simply false, but relatively true, also certain things may be true, and yet not true simply. Chap. Xxvi.--1. In solution of arguments from the definition of elenchus, we must consider the conclusion with reference to contradiction, since except there is the latter, there is no elenchus. Chap, Xxvii.--1. Sophisms from petitio principii must not be granted to the inquirer. 2. If the original question be dubious, the fault must be charged on the questionist. 3. The defender must plead that he did not grant it for the opponent's use, but in order syllogistically to prove the contrary. Chap, Xxvhi.--1. Solution of deceptions from consequents we must draw from the argument itself. 2. The consequence of consequents is either as universal to particular, or according to oppositions. Chap. Xxix.--1. Whatever syllogistically concludes from some addition, we must observe whether it being taken away, the impossible results, afterwards making this clear, we must state that the respondent granted not what appeared true, but what was adapted to the argument, and the charge of irrelevant argument must be brought against the arguer. Chap. Xxx.--1. Against sophisms which make many interrogations one, we must use definition immediately at first. 2. Some arguments of this kind come under the head of equivocation. Chap. Xxxi.--1. In sophisms leading to repetition, we must deny that the...
