Publisher's Synopsis
The phenomenon of cost overruns in Department of Defense acquisition
programs has been a problem for decades. In fact, regulations to control
defense procurements extend as far back as the 1940's. However, these
policies have accomplished little in controlling or reducing the problem. A 1993
Rand Corporation study discussed the extent of cost growth in the DoD and
indicated that cost growth has fluctuated around 20 percent since the mid 1960's
and that little improvement has occurred over time (Drezner and others, 1993:2).
Other research indicates that the average cost overrun on DoD acquisition
contracts is approximately 40 percent (Gansler, 1989:4). However one
measures the unplanned cost increases (growth or overruns to be explained
later in this thesis) is academic; the magnitude of the problem persists and is
readily seen as 20 to 40 percent can represent a notable loss.
