Publisher's Synopsis
Small nations should not be asking themselves whether they need air combat forces or not-they do. Combat aircraft are a nation's most visible, flexible, and lethal force option that can be employed, or threatened to be employed, in a range of missions. However small Western democratic national air forces suffer from lack of platforms, budgetary pressures, economics, credibility, and a visible threat. They are unable to mount a credible unilateral response, and with limited budgets they cannot pursue air force structures of multiple aircraft types and attempts to remain balanced, i.e. capable of performing a range of functions associated with the effective employment of combat air power. Broadly speaking small nations have two choices: firstly structure for combined operations (be it alliance/coalition), or secondly equip for unilateral action if the perceived threat and/or unlikely hood of outside assistance dictates. For combined operations it makes sense to consolidate the combat aircraft into a single fighter-bomber type, with the intention of operating in a probable American led coalition-(the United States [US] would secure, protect, and run the area of operations [AO]). This aircraft does not need to be highly sophisticated but it must be equipped to be able to function in a coalition-capable of precision engagement, self protection, and communicating with its coalition partners. Countries choosing a unilateral option are faced with a number of difficulties. There is a limited choice in the ways of "means" as well as the not insignificant question of "ways" to effectively employ a small number of aircraft to provide a credible response. Again, economically, consolidation of effort into a single independently survivable fighter-type aircraft is desirable.
