Publisher's Synopsis
By not following up his victory at Dresden (26th - 27th August) and pressing and harassing his defeated foe with all his available forces, Napoleon lost the best opportunity of destroying the main army of the allied coalition, and in not doing so, allowed himself to be finally defeated by their combined strength at the battle of Leipzig (16th - 19th October).
Kulm may not be one of the great battles of history, but it could have been the deciding factor in a resurgence, albeit brief, of Napoleon's control of Germany. Had the French emperor put himself at the head of the pursuit after Dresden instead of turning his back on the main chance and trying to deal with the disasters that had occurred at Gross Beeren and on the Katzbach, which, although they were indeed a course of real concern, would have been negated by the destruction of the Army of Bohemia, and possibly even the capture of all three allied monarchs. Indeed, the facts that have emerged concerning the actual state of the allied retreat after Dresden make it clear that the way in which they were distributed could, with constant harassment, have resulted in their being defeated in detail before they would have been able to form a united front.
