Publisher's Synopsis
This study is the thirteenth in a series of historical reports on the war in Southeast Asia prepared by the Office of Air Force History since 1965. The previous Works include: USAF Plans and Operations: The Air Campaign Against North Vietnam, 1966; The Air Force in Vietnam: The Search for Military Alternatives; and The Air Force in Southeast Asia: Toward a Bombing Halt, 1968. In this report the author has focused on policy changes introduced by the Nixon administration during 1969 in regards to the Vietnamese war, particularly as they affected the role of air power. Repeatedly expressing determination to end the war as early as possible on the basis of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people, President Nixon decided -- after negotiations with the Communists in Paris proved fruitless -- to unilaterally withdraw U.S. forces while simultaneously strengthening Saigon's forces to take up the slack. The first reduction in U.S. military strength in Vietnam took place during the summer of 1969 when 25,000 troops were withdrawn. However, a particular phenomenon of the year was that air power was not materially reduced. The main theme of this history is that, in his effort to "wind down" the war via Vietnamization while maintaining pressure on North Vietnam to negotiate, the President made new and greater use of the U.S. air arm.
