Publisher's Synopsis
The 1968 Tet Offensive was the decisive battle for Vietnam. It was masterminded by the brilliant North Vietnamese General, Vo Nguyen Giap, and was intended to trigger a general uprising in South Vietnam. However, the bloody fighting for Saigon, Hue and other cities instead resulted in a catastrophic defeat for the North. Despite this, the Tet Offensive came to be perceived as a defeat by the American people, convincing the public that the war in Vietnam was lost.
The 1968 Tet Offensive was the decisive battle for Vietnam. Masterminded by the brilliant North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap, it was intended to trigger a general uprising in South Vietnam. Detailing the plans and forces involved, James Arnold demonstrates how instead the bloody fighting for Saigon, Hue and other cities resulted in a catastrophic defeat for the North; and how, paradoxically, the American people and their leaders came to perceive the war for Vietnam was lost. Another paradox is how the change in Communist tactics from a classic guerrilla approach to a conventional offensive surprised the Americans: US troops, having dropped their heavy weapons in favour of mobility during jungle-fighting days, suddenly found themselves virtually devoid of ground-based fire support. Inadequacies in American intelligence are looked at and the disastrous results recounted. The effect of such dramatic actions as the storming of the US embassy on the American public is also studied: reactions back home to press reports from the front were what made the Tet offensive an American political defeat in spite of the battlefield outcome being vastly in the US's favour by the end of the fighting.
