Publisher's Synopsis
Historically, philosophers have based much knowledge upon intuition, but this
tradition found itself under increasing criticism. Claims of intuitive knowledge have
been accused of being asserted dogmatically, and when pressed for justification,
proponents of intuitive knowledge often fail to provide satisfactory replies. So it is no
surprise that intuition as a base for knowledge has come to strike many modern
thinkers as suspect. Proponents of intuition have been accused of treating intuition
as a superpower able to peer into a Platonistic realm of facts. Not only is it highly
dubious whether such a mental faculty could exist, but widespread disagreement on
intuitive knowledge casts doubt on the ability of intuition to provide knowledge at all,
superpowered or not. This has led some to abandon intuition entirely, and argue that
philosophy relying upon intuition is misguided or hopeless. If intuition is epistemically
suspect, then moral philosophy is in trouble since intuition is widely used and
regarded as epistemically valuable.
