Publisher's Synopsis
All the key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by Tony Blair's government in a 60,000-word book.
Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as the 'Chilcot Report') tackled:
- Saddam Hussein's threat to Britain
- the legal advice for the invasion
- intelligence about weapons of mass destruction and
- planning for a post-conflict Iraq.
The behaviour of the GCHQ whistleblower Katharine Gun and the controversy over whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction formed the subject of the political thriller Official Secrets.
Philippe Sands QC wrote in the London Review of Books:
'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.'
Published under an Open Government Licence, this book aims to make better known the findings of the Iraq Inquiry, which took seven years to complete at a cost of £10 million.
The text, headings, footnotes and any emphasis are exactly those of the original document.
Contents
Introduction
Pre-conflict strategy and planning
The UK decision to support US military action
Why Iraq? Why now?
The UK's relationship with the US
Decision-making
Advice on the legal basis for military action
Weapons of mass destruction
Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq
The post-conflict period
Occupation
Transition
Planning for withdrawal
Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq?
Key findings
Lessons
Timeline of events
REVIEWS
The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot and composed of five privy councillors, finally published its report on the morning of 6 July, seven years and 21 days after it was established by Gordon Brown with a remit to look at the run-up to the conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction, so that we can learn lessons.
It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.
- Philippe Sands, London Review of Books
A more productive way to think of the Chilcot report is as a tool to help us set agendas for renewed best efforts in creating more effective and accountable statecraft.
Chilcot has confirmed that... we still do not have intelligent long-range planning by the armed forces in close and active cooperation with other government agencies, nor an adequate and integrated system for the collection and evaluation of intelligence information, nor do we have the highest possible quality and stature of personnel to lead us through these challenging times.
- Derek B. Miller, The Guardian
Although sceptics wondered how much more the very-long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher. In all, it is a further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies.
Among its conclusions the report says that there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; that the British chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted; that military action was not a last resort...
- Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The New York Review of Books
Introduction (Extract)
1. In 2003, for the first time since the Second World War, the United Kingdom took part in an opposed invasion and full-scale occupation of a sovereign State - Iraq. Cabinet decided on 17 March to join the US-led invasion of Iraq, assuming there was no last-minute capitulation by Saddam Hussein. That decision was ratified by Parliament the next day and implemented the night after that.
2. Until 28 June 2004, the UK was a joint Occupying Power in Iraq. For the next five years, UK forces remained in Iraq with responsibility for security in the South-East; and the UK sought to assist with stabilisation and reconstruction.
3. The consequences of the invasion and of the conflict within Iraq which followed are still being felt in Iraq and the wider Middle East, as well as in the UK. It left families bereaved and many individuals wounded, mentally as well as physically. After harsh deprivation under Saddam Hussein's regime, the Iraqi people suffered further years of violence.
4. The decision to use force - a very serious decision for any government to take - provoked profound controversy in relation to Iraq and became even more controversial when it was subsequently found that Iraq's programmes to develop and produce chemical, biological and nuclear weapons had been dismantled. It continues to shape debates on national security policy and the circumstances in which to intervene.
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