Publisher's Synopsis
It will be useful to begin with an extensive introduction to personhood in general.
Like many other terms, philosophers oftentimes use the word 'person' differently from
the colloquial use of the word. This colloquial use is usually meant to be singular for
'people', or to mean 'a human being'. Although philosophers do use the word in these
ways, they also use it in yet another way. Our first question, then, I will call The
Personhood Question: "What is it to be a person?" That is, what makes persons different
from non-persons? What do persons have that non-persons do not have? Are human
beings the only candidates for persons or are there (or could there be) nonhuman persons?
Many philosophers throughout history have discussed these questions and
suggested answers to them. A common trend from the Early Modern Period of Western
philosophy (specifically Descartes and Locke) was to favor the mental aspect as essential
to personhood. For Descartes, you are your mind. That is, you are an immaterial
substance that thinks. The Cartesian view of personhood is thus associated with the
person's soul. Locke similarly described a person as, "a thinking intelligent being, that
has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in
different times and places."1 According to him, you are a conscious being that persists by
means of continued consciousness and memory. For both Descartes and Locke, a person
is a conscious agent capable of interacting with and experiencing the world and
generating plans or desires upon which to act.
