Publisher's Synopsis
This study examines the U.S. response to Palestinian terror in the late 1960s-early 1970s in an effort to offer insights into why governments respond as they do to transnational terror, an issue of particular relevance in the wake of September 11, 2001. This study examines the factors affecting government policy, and particularly the relationship among terrorists' strategy and tactics, elite decisionmakers' international strategic perspective, critical features of the domestic political landscape, and policymakers' efforts to manipulate counter-terror policies to pursue non-terror related objectives. Detailed examination of the archival record surrounding such key terrorist events as Black September, Munich, Khartoum, Ma'alot, and Entebbe, analysis of critical negotiations involving Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S., and consideration of significant domestic developments involving Watergate, the Vietnam War, and Ford's pardon of Nixon shed light on the interplay among terrorist actions, strategic interests, and political concerns during the Nixon and Ford administrations and point to more general conclusions about the impact of transnational terrorism on gove
