Publisher's Synopsis
Following from the first volume which tackled the formal aspects of Al, this book looks at one of the central questions: that machines cannot think, or have emotions and experiences, because they cannot be conscious.;The views of Dennet, Searle, Davidson and Nagel with their implications for Al, together with recent developments in neurocomputing, are examined. The identification of the central issues which make up the area called "the philosophy of artificial intelligence" is the main purpose of this book. Starting with Turing's original objections as he phrased them, the book fans out from there looking at connectionism, computationalism and the argument of continuity in the nervous system.;Coverage is given to the broader view of what Al is all about, examining the subject matter and methodology of Al and comparing traditional views of scientific methodology with Al practice. This leads to the final chapter in which a rephrasing of the limitation Game is proposed, asking the question 'can machines think?' and ultimately providing the criteria by which Al research is distinguished from traditional computing and psychological research.
