Publisher's Synopsis
The United States has now invaded Iraq on two separate occasions. These invasions offer some interesting similarities such as occurring on nearly the same terrain with similar equipment and against Iraqi forces under the leadership of Saddam Hussein. The first invasion occurred in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm (ODS) with the objective of liberating Kuwait from Iraqi forces. The second occurred in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) with the objective of forcing Saddam Hussein from power. These dissimilar objectives, in conjunction with a lapse of twelve years, resulted in some basic differences. Some of these notable differences are the distance traveled in the offense, the tempo of the operations, enemy actions and responses, preparation time available for the campaign planners, and the forces employed in the offensive. Another significant point, and the focus of this paper, is the conduct and effectiveness of the logistics system used in support of these offensives. Of particular concern is the fact that each offensive encountered, or nearly encountered, a logistic pause. For the purpose of this research, the definition of a logistic pause is the unplanned delay in military operations due to the inability to coordinate or complete effective logistic support in a predictable manner. The fact that ODS nearly encountered a logistic pause and OIF did encounter a pause indicates that logistic efforts may have been lacking in both operations. However, the intent of this paper is not to persuade the reader that a logistic pause is indicative of a failure to plan or properly execute a ground offensive. Current joint doctrine recognizes that pauses may be required to prevent a major operation from reaching the end of its sustainability and in some circumstances are necessary due to logistical constraints or shortfalls. Simply stated, a planned pause may provide the safety valve to avoid culmination, but an unplanned pause risks losing the initiative or hindering the execution of the maneuver plan. Admittedly, a paper of this length cannot address every factor that contributes to the need for a logistic pause nor offer comprehensive means of mitigation. However, using the ground offensives of ODS and OIF as reference points, this paper explores aspects of these campaigns that proved critical to the development, or near development of a logistic pause in these operations. This paper addresses logistic support measures, deployment planning, doctrinal impacts, and distribution problems for each operation and provides recommendations for addressing, or mitigating the need for an unplanned logistic pause through the lenses of doctrine, organization, and leadership.
