Publisher's Synopsis
This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1785 edition. Excerpt: ... amongst these the most probable is, that he was mistaken as to the strength of both fleets. As to his own, he looked upon it as certain, that count d'E strees, with his squadron, would have joined the fleet before any opportunity offered of fighting, and that count Tourville's line of battle should have consisted of sixty-fix ships at least. He was, however, deceived in both: count d'Estrees met with such bad weather in passing the streights of Gibraltar, that, notwithstanding all the pains he could take, his squadron did not arrive at La Hogue till after the battle; and, though there were at that time sixty-six French men of war at sea, yet, from the detachments made for particular services, count Tourville had but forty-four actually under his command, when he took this resolution to fight P. On the other side it was presumed, that the English and Dutch fleets could not have joined so early, and that, if they had, still it would be impossible for them to unite with their two great squadrons then at sea, before the junction of the French fleets. In this, too, the king's foresight failed him; but then it was owing to that bold stroke of admiral Jtussel beforementioned, by which he joined the Dutch squadron ten days sooner than he could have done, if he had taken his pilot's advice q. There is yet another circumstance mentioned by French authors, as supposed by some to have been a reason for the king's orders, and it is this, that the greatest part of the English fleet were expected to desert, from which it is pretended they were deterred by finding count Tourville so weak'. As these very authors treat this story as a calumny, there seems to be the less reason for my refuting it: yet, since it may be done in very few words, I cannot...
