Publisher's Synopsis
In recent years, the importance of operating in and protecting the cyberdomain has gained much attention. As long as our nation relies on computernetworks as a foundation for military and economic power, our national andeconomic security are at risk through the cyber domain. Cyber attacks on USindustry and government systems severely impact our economy and ability toexecute modern network-centric warfare.Our reliance on networked systems and the high costs associated with cyberattacks have led many leaders in the US government and Department ofDefense to focus resources toward developing a strategy for deterring adversariesfrom attacking our networks in the first place. This effort has led tomuch debate about the question, is cyber deterrence possible? Deterrence inthe cyber domain is drastically different and far more complicated than inother military domains (air, land, sea, and space). Cyber weapons and offensivecyber techniques are relatively inexpensive and easily obtained or developed.The number of adversary groups capable of attacking US networks is large, and our ability to deter each group will vary based on its motives and levels ofrisk tolerance. An effective cyber deterrence strategy must be multilayeredand use all instruments of US national power. This paper discusses the difficultiesof deterring unwanted cyber activities, provides some realistic expectationsfor a deterrence strategy, and offers proposals to help mitigate the problems
