Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games - Theory and Decision Library C

In this book we study systematically the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games, and the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal barga- ing set of NTU games. To each solution we devote a separate chapter wherein we study its properties in full detail. Moreover, important va- ants are de?ned or even intensively analyzed. We also investigate in separate chapters continuity, dynamics, and geometric properties of - lutions of TU games. Our study culminates in uniform and coherent axiomatizations of all the foregoing solutions (excluding the bargaining set). It is our pleasure to acknowledge the help of the following persons and institutions. We express our gratitude to Michael Maschler for his - tailed comments on an early version, due to the ?rst author, of Chapters 2-8. We thank Michael Borns for the linguistic edition of the manuscript of this book. We are indebted to Claus-Jochen Haake, Sven Klauke, and Christian Weiß for reading large parts of the manuscript and sugge- ing many improvements. Peter Sudh¨ olter is grateful to the Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and to the Edmund Landau Center for Research in Ma- ematical Analysis and Related Areas, the Institute of Mathematics of xv xvi PREFACE the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, for their hospitality during the a- demic year 2000-01 and during the summer of 2002.