Publisher's Synopsis
On November 5, 1854 the Russians marched out of the besieged city of Sevastopol to throw off the allied British and French forces by mounting a joint attack with their troops from outside the city. Despite outnumbering their enemies five to one the Russians failed to achieve victory in what looked to be almost a foregone conclusion. The third major action of the Crimean War (following Alma and Balaclava), the battle fought in heavy fog at Inkerman proved to be a testament to the skill and initiative of the individual men and officers of the British Army of the day.
On 5 November 1854 the Russians marched out of the besieged city of Sevastopol to throw off the allied British and French forces by mounting a joint attack with their troops from outside the city. Despite outnumbering their enemies five to one the Russians failed to achieve victory in what looked to be almost a foregone conclusion. The third major action of the Crimean War (following Alma and Balaclava), the battle fought in heavy fog at Inkerman proved to be a testament to the skill and initiative of the individual men and officers of the British Army of the day. Although they and their French allies lost 2,357 and 929 men respectively, the Russians lost 10,729, six of which were general officers and another six regimental commanders. On an organisational level the effects of the battle on the Russian field army were severe: of the battalions committed to the fight 16 were unscathed, 12 were utterly ruined, 12 had to be withdrawn from the order of battle and ten were deemed fit for duty but at reduced strength. The British felt their losses too, in spite of the victory. Unable to reinforce their troops speedily, the losses at Inkerman meant that a speedy assault on Sevastopol was no longer a possibility: the Russians, though defeated, had successfully stalled a crucial allied offensive.
