Publisher's Synopsis
Violent non-state actors persist in their use of conventional attack methods despite the availability of more advanced technology. This is puzzling because accepted wisdom states that, if the technology is available, an actor will adopt it. The term "radical leveling technologies" was recently coined by Jennifer Snow to define a new set of technologies that can upset existing balances of power and potentially allow violent non-state actors access to increasingly destructive or disruptive technology that was previously out of their reach. This concept underlines the easing of technological barriers for both state and non-state actors to obtain increasingly destructive/disruptive weapons. The tension between these two trends is indicative of a puzzle, in that there is little predictive capability regarding which groups will seek to adopt emerging or radical leveling technologies. Due to the nature of the problem, case studies involving violent non-state actors who conduct limited acts of violence would likely be irrelevant, as it is the less constrained violent non-state actors who are more likely to adopt technology that could cause mass destruction or disruption. Using the Possibility Principle, as delineated by James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, case selection for this thesis was dependent upon whether the "outcome of interest is possible." Because of this principle, the sample of cases was restricted to those groups with a demonstrated willingness to engage in higher order violence. The cases selected from this delimited pool were Chechen separatists; the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSAL); and Aum Shinrikyo.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.Ultimately, in the case of the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord, and Aum Shinrikyo, the independent variables of goal and audience needs affected the selection of specific modes of violence. However, in the case of the Chechen separatists only the audience needs shifted, though that seems to have been sufficient to impact the dependent variable. Notably, except for the Aum case, where there was a stated predilection for advanced technologies, each case showed that even when the actors had the opportunity to pursue high-cost technology options they chose to continue their use of low-cost technologies, though the destructive capacity of their choices shifted. Both the Chechen separatists and CSAL had access to high-cost technology options and yet, with one exception, neither used them. Each actor was driven and constrained by their goals and narrative as well as their disparate audience needs. Interestingly, in all three cases, the actors constrained themselves. In the case of Aum, this constraint was likely due to the inconsistency of other modes of violence with their narrative; in the case of the Chechen separatists, likely due to the demonstrated inefficiency of using the more destructive modes of violence as a strategic tool; and for CSAL, likely due to a combination of their lack of belief in their narrative and minus an existential threat in the form of government countermeasures. These findings substantiate the idea that less constrained actors are more likely to reach for more destructive capabilities, but that the technology that they reach for must be consistent with their goals, narrative, and audience needs.
