Publisher's Synopsis
This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1922 edition. Excerpt: ... II Venizelist policy for four weeks more." The moment to act had come, but the king would not move. Zaimis resigned. When Calogeropoulos..came to the premiership, tension reached its height. From all the larger islands of the Cyclades came manifestos, approved by large assemblies, urging Constantine to recall Venizelos without delay and threatening in case of refusal to establish a revolutionary government. This, however, did not shake Constantine's resolve. It made him more insolent. Losing all hope to win his sovereign back, Venizelos at last decided to take a drastic step to save Greece. He gave Constantine up. On September 26, accompanied by Admiral Koundouriotis, he left Athens. The next day they landed in Crete and proclaimed a revolution. e. The Entente's It is said that Baron Schenk, when expelled Blunders. from Athens with a pack of German agents of propaganda, said to an American Journalist who asked him about the future: "The question whether my work in Greece will last depends entirely on the Allies, who up to now have been my best assistants." This is no doubt an exaggerated statement. It reflects, neverthless, the folly and weakness of the Entente policy in the Balkans ever since the beginning of the Great War. II. An interview given by Venizelos March 13,1917 to the special envoy of the Havas agency, quoted by A. Gauvain, op.cit., pp.64. The secret treaty concluded between Italy and the Entente April 15,1915 was oftened refered to as a piece of poor diplomacy. This, to the writer, seems not true. Of course, every thing that Italy demanded and obtained from this arrangement, 12 was directly opposed to the Interests of Greece, and therefore gave Constantine more pretext to keep Greece out of the war, but in the early spring of...
