Publisher's Synopsis
The first duty which devolves upon the mother in the training of her child is the establishment ofher authority over him-that is, the forming in him the habit of immediate, implicit, andunquestioning obedience to all her commands. And the first step to be taken, or, rather, perhaps thefirst essential condition required for the performance of this duty, is the fixing of the conviction inher own mind that it is a duty.Unfortunately, however, there are not only vast numbers of mothers who do not in any degreeperform this duty, but a large proportion of them have not even a theoretical idea of the obligationof it.An Objection."I wish my child to be governed by reason and reflection," says one. "I wish him to see the necessityand propriety of what I require of him, so that he may render a ready and willing compliance with mywishes, instead of being obliged blindly to submit to arbitrary and despotic power."She forgets that the faculties of reason and reflection, and the power of appreciating "the necessityand propriety of things," and of bringing considerations of future, remote, and perhaps contingentgood and evil to restrain and subdue the impetuousness of appetites and passions eager for presentpleasure, are qualities that appear late, and are very slowly developed, in the infantile mind; that noreal reliance whatever can be placed upon them in the early years of life; and that, moreover, one ofthe chief and expressly intended objects of the establishment of the parental relation is to provide, inthe mature reason and reflection of the father and mother, the means of guidance which the embryoreason and reflection of the child could not afford during the period of his immaturity.The two great Elements of Parental Obligation.Indeed, the chief end and aim of the parental relation, as designed by the Author of nature, may beconsidered as comprised, it would seem, in these two objects, namely: first, the support of the childby the strength of his parents during the period necessary for the development of his strength, and, secondly, his guidance and direction by their reason during the development of his reason. Thesecond of these obligations is no less imperious than the first. To expect him to provide the meansof his support from the resources of his own embryo strength, would imply no greatermisapprehension on the part of his father and mother than to look for the exercise of any reallycontrolling influence over his conduct by his embryo reason. The expectation in the two caseswould be equally vain. The only difference would be that, in the failure which would inevitably resultfrom the trial, it would be in the one case the body that would suffer, and in the other the soul.
