Publisher's Synopsis
This series presents state-of-the-art monographs covering a speciality from the basic elements through to the most advanced results. Its aim is to enable economists or anyone with a background in economics, to gain access to the latest developments. The series is divided into sections corresponding to the various economics, each with its own editor.;This volume in the series provides an approach to oligopoly, revealing and integrating recent research in the game-theoretic issues of information, commitment and timing. Using complete information models, the authors offer insight into effective ways of deterring and accommodating entry into capital accumulation, examine expenditures on the adoption and development of new technology, and analyze dynamic price competition and fixed costs as entry barriers. They develop incomplete information models for exploring limit pricing and predation, gradually introducing essential game-theoretic concepts to provide graduate students and researchers in industrial organization and related fields with a solid fondation for the use of dynamic models.
