Publisher's Synopsis
Marian David defends the correspondence theory of truth against the disquotational theory of truth, its current major rival. The correspondence theory asserts that truth is a philosophically rich and profound notion which needs serious explanation. Disquotationalism is a radically deflationary philosophy of truth inspired by Tarski and propagated by Quine and others. It rejects the correspondence theory, insists truth is anemic, and advances an "anti-theory" of truth that is essentially a collection of platitudes: "Snow is white" is true only if snow is actually white; "Grass is green" is true only if grass is actually green. According to disquotationalists the only profound insight about truth is that it lacks profundity. David contrasts the correspondence theory with disquotationalism and then develops the latter position in rich detail - more than has been available in previous literature - to show its faults. He demonstrates that disquotationalism is not a tenable theory of truth, as it has too many absurd consequences.
