Publisher's Synopsis
With information technologies increasingly shaping the environment in which U.S. military forces operate, Joint Vision 2020 and other recent DoD literature highlight the fundamental importance of achieving "decision superiority "--essentially, "making better decisions faster "" than any adversary. This monograph examines the feasibility and usefulness of the decision superiority concept at the operational and tactical levels of war, using John F. Schmitt 's "A Practical Guide for Developing and Writing Military Concepts "" as a source for evaluation criteria. Specifically, the monograph assesses the degree to which the decision superiority concept is consistent with the nature and theory of war, reflects a historical understanding of war, balances military art and science, and fits within the proper military-technological context. The monograph concludes that despite JV 2020 's initial discussion of human factors and their crucial importance in achieving decision superiority, other DoD concept papers published since June 2000 have presented a largely one-sided view of the subject, essentially that current and promised future technology alone will enable decision superiority. As a result, the decision superiority concept in its current state is neither feasible nor particularly useful for the U.S. military. A more balanced approach to the problem of uncertainty, one that emphasizes human factors as strongly as technological enablers, accurately accounts for and accepts both the nature of war and historical lessons, and provides a proper mix of military art and science, would result in a more realistic and beneficial concept for further development within the ongoing DoD Transformation.
