Publisher's Synopsis
The integration of West Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) became one of the most important and contentious problems of post-war security. Increasing Cold War tensions during and after 1949 had led Britain to consider the need to rearm West Germany. Yet fears of a resurgent Germany existed both in Britain and on the continent. The timing and manner of German incorporation was crucial and became the subject of lengthy negotiations. Using extensive archival material, Saki Dockrill stresses how the government was forced to react to the constantly changing positions adopted by the USA, France and Germany itself and addresses three main issues: What made Britain accept the need for a German contribution to the defence of Western Europe? Why was Britain reluctant to encourage any hasty American and French proposals? And why did Britain eventually put forward proposals that successfully resolved the crisis? This was the first book-length analysis of the formulation of Britain's strategy for rearming West Germany and will be of interest to specialists and students of international politics, with special reference to post-war diplomatic history, NATO and European security.
