Publisher's Synopsis
This study examines the Army's top-down performance evaluation system. Many claim that it drives behavior in organizations that not only inhibits the exercise of mission command, but also rewards image management over organizational leadership. Colonel Curtis Taylor takes a hard look at this system, its benefits and its cultural incentives. More importantly, he asks if the current system promotes or impedes the exercise of mission command. After examining the history of the Army's performance evaluation system and alternative models outside the military, Colonel Taylor concludes that a more holistic system that combines top-down evaluations, peer and subordinate evaluation, and objective testing might be a better approach. The Strategic Studies Institute offers this monograph to enable its readers to assess whether the recommended system may balance incentives more carefully, ensuring that the very best organizational leaders are easier to identify, assign, and promote. In 2014, the National Defense Authorization Act directed the Department of Defense to reconsider the way the Army evaluates and selects leaders. This call for reform came after repeated surveys from the Center for Army Leadership suggested widespread dissatisfaction with the current approach. The U.S. Army today is seeking to inculcate a philosophy of mission command across the force based on a culture of mutual trust, clear intent, and decentralized initiative. It is, therefore, reasonable to ask if our current performance evaluation system contributes or detracts from such a culture. This monograph seeks to answer this question by considering the essential leader attributes required for the exercise of mission command and then considering practical methods for evaluating this behavior. It then reviews the history of the existing Army performance evaluation system and analyzes how well this system conforms to the attributes of mission command. Finally, it examines other methods of performance evaluation outside of the Army to determine if those methods could provide a better model. This examination included a variety of best practice models in private business and the public sector and identified alternative approaches to performance evaluation. Three alternative models were chosen for scrutiny because they demonstrated an ability to specifically identify and select for the leader attributes essential to mission command. The monograph concludes that the U.S. Army's current officer evaluation system is ill-suited to evaluate mission command attributes. The author's findings suggest that our current system is not wrong, but rather is incomplete. The research suggests that a combination of top-down evaluations, peer and subordinate reviews, and objective testing of critical skills might equip U.S. Army boards to identify better the best practitioners of the mission command philosophy. Two specific proposals are suggested for further research in the appendix. The first proposes to conduct background investigations for command select positions modelled after the single scope background investigation security clearance interviews. The second proposes the creation of assessment centers within the U.S. Army to evaluate potential to perform in future assignments.
