Publisher's Synopsis
Philosophers as diverse as Socrates, Plato, Spinoza, and Rawls have sometimes argued that ethics can be an exact discipline whose propositions can match the exactness we associate with mathematics. Yet for Aristotle, knowledge of ethical matters is essentially inexact, and his perceptive criticisms of the Socratic-Platonic ideal of ethical knowledge and its metaphysical presuppositions remain of enduring interest to contemporary moral theorists.
Georgios Anagnostopoulos offers the most systematic and comprehensive critical examination to date of Aristotle's views on the exactness of ethics. Combining rigorous philosophical argument and close analysis of the philosopher's treatises on human conduct, he gives form to Aristotle's belief that knowledge of matters of conduct, not unlike knowledge of most natural phenomena, can never be free of certain kinds of inexactness. He concludes that according to Aristotle, ethics constitutes a mode of knowledge that is neither totally nondemonstrative on account of its inexactness nor free of the important epistemological difficulties common to all nonmathematical disciplines.
Georgios Anagnostopoulos offers the most systematic and comprehensive critical examination to date of Aristotle's views on the exactness of ethics. Combining rigorous philosophical argument and close analysis of the philosopher's treatises on human conduct, he gives form to Aristotle's belief that knowledge of matters of conduct, not unlike knowledge of most natural phenomena, can never be free of certain kinds of inexactness. He concludes that according to Aristotle, ethics constitutes a mode of knowledge that is neither totally nondemonstrative on account of its inexactness nor free of the important epistemological difficulties common to all nonmathematical disciplines.
