America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974: Calculated Conspiracy or Foreign Policy Failure?

The book examines recently released and declassified British and American government documents, in order to scrutinize the roles played by both of these countries during the Cyprus crisis of 1974. It evaluates British and American aims towards Cyprus, analysing in particular the roles played by British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan and US Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger, and their respective relationships with the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish governments. Also, the book considers Whitehall and Washington's responses to the Greek military coup, the Turkish invasion, the two Geneva conferences on Cyprus and the second, consolidatory, phase of the Turkish invasion. Ultimately, the book seeks to ascertain whether there exists any credible evidence to support the belief that Britain and/or America were complicit in the coup against President Makarios as well as whether they colluded with Ankara in her subsequent partition of the island.