Publisher's Synopsis
This monograph is a doctrinal and historical analysis of river crossings by the United States and the Soviet Union. Initially, there is a discussion of the impact of AirLand Battle doctrine has on river crossings which concludes that the hasty crossing is the preferred method. Then there is an analysis of current U.S. doctrine as found in field manuals, professional periodicals, and as taught in service schools. This doctrinal analysis is followed by a historical analysis of the Italian, northwest European, and Korean campaigns to reveal the inadequacy of U.S. doctrine. Searching for a more adequate crossing doctrine, the author analyzes Soviet experiences during World War II. The author concludes that certain aspects of Soviet World War II crossing doctrine are applicable to the formation of a contemporary U.S. doctrine. These are: selection of multiple crossing points; avoidance of enemy strength; selection of least expected crossing locations; employment of expedient crossing methods; earlier initiation of the planning process; better trained reconnaissance forces; conduct of operations during periods of reduced visibility; and rapid continuation of the attack. This monograph is only the initial process in rewriting U.S. river crossing doctrine. It provides a point of departure for further discussion and research.
