Publisher's Synopsis
MISS JONES'S object in this [book] is to propound "a certain analysis of categorical propositions of the forms S is P, S is not P, to show that this is the only general analysis which it is possible to accept, and to indicate its bearing upon logical science." We need propositions of these forms for significant assertion, and without them no satisfactory statement can be given of the three fundamental laws of thought. The first two of these are commonly formulated as (1) A is A, (2) A is not non-A, and the third sometimes as A is either A or non-A. Desperate efforts have been made by logicians to give a valuable meaning to A is A; but if A is A, interpreted as A is A, is retained as the first fundamental law, there is no possible passage from it to A is B. Lotze therefore gives up (theoretically) S is P. A is A tells us no more than A is A, and if we begin with it, we must also end with it, if we are to be consistent. We must, then, not begin with it, but with a law of significant assertion-assertion of the forms S is P, S is not P. If we start with the principle that every subject of Predication is an identity (of denotation) in diversity (of intension) this law and the laws of contradiction and excluded middle do furnish a real and adequate and obvious basis and starting point of "formal logic."
Miss Jones illustrates and applies her contention in a concise but interesting way, and Prof. Stout thinks that she makes out her case.
- Nature, Volume 87 [1911]
