Publisher's Synopsis
This study is based on the supposition that the future employment of U.S. military forces will be in joint operations focused against third world threats. The current trend of proliferation of high-technology weapons to third world countries will result in many nations that have small, but modern, forces with high battlefield leverage. Faced with less resources, more potent threats, and the need to win quickly, future joint commanders will be required to employ their forces with imagination. To win, they must seize the initiative early and hold it to the end. This study suggests that a joint doctrine that emphasizes the full potential of deep operations to impact battle on an operational level provides the means to rapidly defeat the enemy. This study examines the feasibility of adapting the more prescriptive Soviet deep operations doctrine for use in future U.S. joint campaigns. To determine the feasibility of using Soviet deep operations doctrine as a template for a more thorough U.S. deep operations doctrine, the development and features of Soviet deep battle and deep operations theory are explored to identify lessons of possible benefit. The Soviet Manchurian Campaign of August 1945 is examined to validate Soviet theory. This theory of deep operations, as manifested by an amphibious OMG, is then evaluated to determine applicability to future Marine Corp amphibious operations.
