Publisher's Synopsis
The Tuareg insurgency in Mali has its roots in the colonial period. However, the insurgency worsened when Mali became independent in 1960. This insurgency was characterized by four main periods. The first rebellion came in 1963, the second rebellion in 1990, the third rebellion came in 1996, and the last one was in 2012, where the Tuaregs again attacked the Malian troops. This thesis argues that developmental policies and military engagement in the northern region were the most significant factors that contributed to the recurrence of the Tuareg insurgency in Mali. However, there are other minor factors, such as the economic difficulties, the emergence of drug trafficking, the weak governance, the decentralization, social collapse, and regional dynamics, that also contributed to the resurgence of the conflict. This thesis stresses that domestic management of the crisis played a more significant role than the external factors. It is crucial for the Mali government to establish secure borders and a secure internal environment in the northern region before instituting any developmental policies. For this reason, the Malian state needs a strong army to prevent malicious actors from entering the region and obstructing the objective of peace. Also, it needs to always pursue and sign realistic agreements.
