Publisher's Synopsis
An excerpt from the introductory to Volume II:
SOME NAMES WHICH REQUIRE A PARTICULAR EXPLANATION.
We have now seen that, in what we call the mental world, Consciousness, there are three grand classes of phenomena, the most familiar of all the facts with which we are acquainted, - SENSATIONS, IDEAS, and the TRAIN OF IDEAS. We have examined a number of the more complicated cases of Consciousness; and have found that they all resolve themselves into the three simple elements, thus enumerated. We also found it necessary to shew, for what ends, and in what manner, marks were contrived of sensations and ideas, and by what combinations they were made to represent, expeditiously, trains of those states of consciousness.
Some marks or names, however, could not be explained, till some of the more complicated states of consciousness were unfolded; these also are names so important, and so peculiar in their mode of signification, that a very complete understanding of them is required. It is to the consideration of these remarkable cases of Naming that we now proceed.*
*Under the modest title of an explanation of the meaning of several names, this chapter presents us with a series of discussions of some of the deepest and most intricate questions in all metaphysics. Like Plato, the author introduces his analysis of the most obscure among the complex general conceptions of the human mind, in the form of an enquiry into the meaning of their names. The title of the chapter gives a very inadequate notion of the difficulty and importance of the speculations contained in it, and which make it, perhaps, the profoundest chapter of the book. It is almost as if a treatise on chemistry were described as an explanation of the names air, water, potass, sulphuric acid, &c. - Ed.
* * * *
"Many questions might be asked, which I shall refrain from asking. For I find Mr. [Bertrand] Russell's manner and method more interesting than his message. And mainly I am impressed by the resemblance between this analysis of mind and another analysis by James Mill, entitled "Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind," published in 1829, which I regard as the best statement of the associational psychology. In both works, "analysis" stands for the same kind of operation; and the results of analysis are not far apart. In James Mill's chapter on "Consciousness" Mr. Russell may find very nearly his own analysis of consciousness, at least his analysis of mind; and in Mill's chapter on "Belief" he may find an analysis which might almost be his own analysis of consciousness. In both chapters he will find Mill fighting with him to establish his major contention that there is nothing in "consciousness" (or in mind) but a relation of content. And his major thesis, that "physics and psychology are not distinguished by their material " is precisely Mill's. For what, after all, are the "neutral entities" of neo-realism but Mill's "phenomena" in other terms? Altogether, it would be very interesting to be told what analysis has accomplished in ninety-two years. Equally striking, however, in Russell and Mill, is the resemblance in style. One notes the same assumption of logical rigor, the same indifference to hostile opinion, the same artificial clearness, and the same finality of statement. But there is also a difference. James Mill's analysis was a savage attempt to convince; one wonders whether Mr. Russell expects to do more than perplex."
-The Philosophical Review, Volume 31 [1922]
