Publisher's Synopsis
Excerpt from Entry and Exit: Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Continuous-Time Stopping Games, April 1991
As the game theoretical extension of the Optimal stopping theory, the literature of continuous time stopping games focuses almost exclusively on the normal form games (see, for example, Huang and Li (1990) and the references therein). There is now an emerging literature on continuous time extensive form games; see for example, Simon (1987) and Simon and Stinchcombe In these papers, however, continuous time games are analyzed by taking limits of the outcomes of discrete time games and there is no exogenous uncertainty.
The purpose of our paper is twofold. First, we extend some of the existing analyses of entry exit games done either in continuous time under certainty or in discrete time under uncertainty to continuous time under uncertainty. Second, in so doing, we also contribute to the continuous time game theory by directly working with continuous time without taking limits of discrete time outcomes.
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